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However, this model was contested by 
feminist, institutional, and social econ-
omists who claimed that the couple 
negotiated division of labor under the 
inf luence of social norms, institutions, 
biases, and power relations. This article 
uses time use data from India to show 
how household division of labor is not 
simply a rational or objective decision 
based on individual’s capacities to earn 
wages in the market, but a complex 
function of social norms and notions 
about expected gender roles. 
Over time, household division of labor 
and its implications for individual well- 
being became an important area of 
study for economists and sociologists 
alike who were interested in studying 
work-life balance, resource alloca-
tion, and bargaining within the family. 
Time use data, which was collected by 
national statistical survey organizations 
based in individual countries since the 
early 1980’s, came in handy for this 
purpose. This data revealed how much 
time individuals devote to activities 
such as paid work, unpaid work includ-
ing household chores and childcare,  
leisure, and self-care activities. This 
data helped researchers in improving 
their understanding about how people 
made decisions about time and how it 
affected their well-being. Surprisingly, 
time use data also revealed a global 
reality: despite an increase in married 
women’s labor force participation, they 
did disproportionately more unpaid 
work than men. This anomaly was 
starker in the Global South where a 
large number of women never entered 
the formal workforce, or quit jobs to 
take care of children and the elderly 
in multigenerational households. 
However, scholarship on household 
division of labor has tended to focus 
on married couples in nuclear families 
only, the dominant household structure 
in advanced industrialized nations. 
In developing economies, multigenera-
tional households are common. These 
households accommodate three to four 
generations and make joint decisions 
about consumption and division of 
labor. Further, gender norms govern-
ing the multigenerational family differ 
substantially from a nuclear family, as 
there are multiple actors, both male 
and female, with varying roles and 
expectations living as one unit. In such 
living arrangements, women under-
take a disproportionately heavy load of 
unpaid care work as there are almost no 
market substitutes for such work; there 
is poor infrastructure; and food security 
is an ongoing concern. In India, the 
multigenerational, patriarchal, patrilo-
cal household is the prevalent form of 
family, and about 312 million people 
live in such an arrangement. A typical 
multigenerational household includes 
the husband’s parents—father-in-law, 
mother-in-law, the husband (son), his 
wife (daughter-in-law), and their chil-
dren. Usually, the father-in-law makes 
unilateral decisions about consumption 
expenditures and distribution of public 
goods within the household, while the 
mother-in-law makes decisions about 
division of labor. She passes on most of 
the household work to the daughter-in-
law, according to traditionally estab-
lished gender roles. The son (husband) 
is usually the primary breadwinner, and 
his wife (daughter-in-law) is subordi-
nate to her husband as well as to her 
parents-in-law.
In India, the multigenerational house-
hold creates the greatest restraint on the 
daughter-in-law’s freedom. The typical 
Indian bride enters a patriarchal family 
through an arranged marriage, where 
she is expected to become obedient to 
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Unlike Hollywood stories, marriage is not just the beginning of the happily ever after, but also the starting point for a number of hard 
questions. Who will go out to work? Who will do 
household chores? Who will look after the kids and 
elderly? And so on. According to the Nobel laureate 
economist, Gary Becker, the answer to these questions 
comes from an unlikely but dependable source: 
division of labor. His idea that rational calculations 
may underpin romantic relationships goes back to 
the 1970s when Becker first proposed an economic 
model of marriage, arguing that marriage was based 
on the principle of division of labor, and that gains 
from marriage were determined by how efficient this 
division was. The one with comparative advantage  
at earning wages would go out and work; and the 
other person would do the chores and stay at home.
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him and his parents. Along with her 
husband, her mother-in-law also moni-
tors her access to material resources 
and external contacts. Consequently, 
co-residence with in-laws is associated 
with stricter gender norms and, in turn, 
lower scores on measures of the daugh-
ter-in-law’s autonomy. The mother-in-
law plays a major role in encouraging 
daughters-in-law to adhere to norms 
such as ‘housework is the ideal wifely 
duty.’ Thus in a multigeneration patri-
archal household, the private sphere of 
housework is negotiated and contested 
between the two women, but under an 
unequal power relation.
We use data from the only available, 
nationally representative Indian time 
use survey (1998-99) to show such a 
division of labor in multigenerational 
families. 
Graph 1 shows time-allocation in 
mean hours of work for all members of 
the household. Activities are divided 
into paid work (work done for wages 
outside the house), unpaid housework 
(cooking, cleaning, laundry and house-
hold repair and maintenance), unpaid 
care work (care of children, sick and 
elderly), and total work (total of paid 
and unpaid work). Results point to a 
strict division of household labor along 
gender lines where men do most of 
the work in the paid labor market and 
women do all the unpaid work in the 
household. Results also point to differ-
ences in housework allocation within 
the same gender, with the daughters-
in-law doing twice the amount of 
unpaid work than their mothers-in-law. 
Data shows that a daughter-in-law is 
the most time-poor individual in the 
multigenerational household as she 
undertakes significantly more total 
work, compared to all other members 
in the household. Male members are 
almost completely absent from day-
to-day tasks within the house and the 
division of labor in the household is 
only between the mother-in-law and 
daughter-in-law, with the daughters-
in-law shouldering a disproportion-
ately high burden of household chores 
(known as reproductive work among 
field specialists) in the household, as 
much as 8 hours of unpaid work per day 
and around 10.5 hours of total work 
on average. The main takeaway from 
this simple analysis is that males do 
not do any unpaid work in their own 
households, and the mother-in-law and 
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GRAPH 1:   Time spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by all members 
of the household in hours per day.
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daughter-in-law do all unpaid work 
with the latter doing disproportionately 
more work. 
Data reveals surprising facts about the 
effect of education on the division of 
labor in the household. In his pioneer-
ing work on India, demographer John 
Caldwell (1984) showed that universal 
education or mass schooling changed 
the cultural superstructure of society. 
He argued that educated women see 
themselves as part of a larger world 
and education acts to reduce “the hold 
of the patriarch,” prepares children 
of both genders to work in a market 
economy, and informs girls of their 
economic options outside the home. 
Caldwell also argued that education 
transformed the power relationship in 
a multigenerational household such 
that, “a young woman with schooling 
is more likely to challenge her in-laws, 
and the in-laws are less likely to fight 
the challenge” (412). According to 
him educated daughters-in-law can 
bargain successfully with less-educated 
mothers-in-law for a larger slice of the 
family budget to spend on food, and 
health care for their children. Thus, 
a young daughter-in-law’s education 
tips the traditional balance of famil-
ial relationships in her favor, and by 
extension she is likely to exert more 
autonomy by doing less household 
work and demanding equal participa-
tion from her mother-in-law. Therefore 
one expects that an increase in the 
education of a daughter-in-law would 
decrease her unpaid work and increase 
her paid work in the economy. 
According to Caldwell’s thesis, their 
paid work should increase, and un- 
paid work should decrease as their  
education increases. 
Graph 2 shows the amount of work 
done by daughters-in-law based on 
their educational levels. Interestingly, 
we see the exact opposite: as the educa-
tion level of a daughter-in-law in a 
multigenerational household increases, 
her paid work decreases while her 
unpaid work increases. How do we 
explain this anomaly?
Patriarchal Bargain Theory
Patriarchal bargain theory (PBT) helps 
explain how the increased bargain-
ing power of an educated daughter-
in-law fails to decrease her burden of 
unpaid household work or increase 
her opportunities for paid work. PBT 
notes that educated women are more 
likely to resist patriarchal norms, and 
are more likely to be subjected to vio-
lence in order to discipline and con-
trol their behavior inside and outside 
the household. While one can argue 
that patriarchal households should 
thus prefer daughters-in-law with less 
education, in reality the reverse hap-
pens. Marriage market preferences in 
India are increasingly skewed towards 
getting an educated bride because she is 
thought to be better at raising children. 
Data shows that a daughter-in-law 
is the most time-poor individual 
in the multigenerational 
household as she undertakes 
significantly more total work, 
compared to all other members  
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GRAPH 2:   Time spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughter- 
in-law in hours per day based on education levels.
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Caste and class heavily inf luence  
practices such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and asset ownership in 
India. These institutions also shape a 
woman’s options outside the home and 
her bargaining power inside it. 
Graphs 3 and 4 show the time spent per 
day on different work activities (paid & 
unpaid) by daughters-in-law based on 
caste and class identities. Graph 3 shows 
This creates a dilemma in patriarchal 
households that feel pressured to accept 
educated brides for their sons, but 
are not ready to accommodate their 
terms. An educated daughter-in-law is 
subjected to coercion and violence to 
mold her according to the norms of the 
patriarchal marital home. These norms 
aim to confine her to unpaid work in 
the household and to restrict her mobil-
ity outside the household. A woman’s 
mobility outside the household is seen 
as an opportunity for romantic or 
sexual encounters out of wedlock, and 
hence fiercely regulated in patriarchal 
households. An educated bride does  
not automatically consent to these 
restrictions and so she is seen by her 
marital family as a threat. Thus, a patri-
archal household considers non-partic-
ipation in market work by women as a 
proxy for sexual fidelity and a marker  
of family honor. 
Since the son is usually employed and 
away from the home during the day, the 
task of confining an educated daughter-
in-law falls on the mother-in-law. She 
makes sure that the daughter-in-law is 
completely devoted to her household 
duties. When a daughter-in-law is more 
educated and assertive, her bargaining 
power challenges the mother-in-law’s 
authority. Thus the mother-in-law 
exerts more power on the daughter-in-
law by giving her even more household 
work. Within this patriarchal context, 
daughters-in-law rarely rebel. Instead 
they are more likely to internalize these 
norms and do more housework in order 
to prove themselves to be compliant 
members of the household. In cases 
where the daughter-in-law rebels,  
violence is used. This is evident from 
the thousands of reported cases of domes-
tic violence in India. 
Role of Caste and Class
While PBT helps explain the unex-
pected results of our time use patterns 
among educated daughters-in-law, 
these patterns vary based on the caste 
and class position of the households. 
that daughters-in-law from ‘upper 
caste’ households (known as ‘General’ 
castes in India) do more unpaid work 
and less paid work per day as compared 
to daughters-in-laws from ‘lower caste’ 
households. Among these marginalized 
‘lower caste’ groups exist two specific 
categories of communities that the 
Indian constitution lists as Scheduled 
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GRAPH 3:   Time spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughter- 
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GRAPH 4:   Time spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughter-in-










Graph 4 shows that daughters-in-law 
from upper class households do more 
unpaid work and less paid work per day 
as compared to daughters-in-law from 
lower class households.
Within the sensibilities of the Indian 
caste system, the higher a particular 
caste group is perceived to be, the 
lesser market work is expected from 
its women. This means that ‘higher’ 
caste households tend to diminish the 
preference for obtaining work and 
incidence of women’s employment 
outside the household. On the other 
hand, such norms are less likely to be 
imposed in households that belong to 
the ‘lower’ castes. These restrictions 
on the bargaining power of Indian 
women are part of the patriarchal setup 
where contact with males outside the 
household is deemed as ‘polluting’ and 
is to be avoided at all cost. Therefore 
working outside, especially for young 
married women, is considered socially 
degrading for the household, and work-
ing inside the house is considered a pure 
form of wifely duty that is enforced as 
well as rewarded. This effect is particu-
larly strong for the daughters-in-law in 
‘upper’ caste households, causing edu-
cated daughters-in-law in ‘upper’ caste 
households to do relatively more house-
work compared to the ‘lower’ caste 
household. Since caste and class status 
in India are highly correlated, upper 
class women also strictly specialize 
in household management, spending 
more time in household/care work. 
But for lower-class married women, 
working outside the home is inevitable 
and is seen as a necessary evil given the 
need for additional income. Increased 
education is less likely to be a source of 
bargaining power for upper caste/class 
daughters-in-law, who are more likely 
to be constrained by caste and class than 
lower caste/class daughters-in-law. 
Conclusion
It is easy to imagine that one chooses to 
spend time based on one’s educational 
qualifications, job, business or interests. 
However, data shows that social norms 
and expectations, such as gender roles, 
play an important role in these deci-
sions. This short piece analyzes the 
Indian time use survey to show how 
individuals spend their time not just 
of their own volition but under the 
inf luence of complex societal factors. 
Finally, these factors are not the same 
for everyone, but differ based on the 
privileges of age, household structure, 
caste, and class.
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The main takeaway from this 
simple analysis is that males do not 
do any unpaid work in their own 
households, and the mother-in-
law and daughter-in-law do all 
unpaid work with the latter doing 
disproportionately more work.
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